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Early retirement is usually explained as a supply-side phenomenon. However, early 
retirement can also be a demand-side phenomenon arising from a firm's profit maximization 
behavior. This paper analyzes voluntary and involuntary early retirement based on 
international microdata covering 19 industrialized countries. The results indicate that 
generous early retirement provisions of the social security system do not only make voluntary 
early retirement more attractive for individuals, but also induce firms to encourage more 
employees to retire early. In particular, firms seem to use early retirement to reduce staff 
during economic recessions and as a means to circumvent employment protection legislation. 
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The trend toward earlier retirement has been one of the most important labor market 
developments in the past fifty years. During this period, participation rates of older workers 
have  fallen  in  virtually  all  OECD  countries.  The  decrease  in  labor  market  participation 
implies considerable economic costs, particularly through social security benefit payments 
and a lower tax base.  
A large body of economic literature has analyzed early retirement behavior from a labor 
supply perspective. According to this literature, workers' retirement decision is based on an 
assessment of future streams of wages and pension payments from public and private sources. 
The optimal retirement date is chosen in order to maximize a worker's future expected utility. 
Examples for such life cycle retirement models are the contributions by Burkhauser (1979), 
Gordon and Blinder (1980), Mitchell and Fields (1982), Burtless (1986), and Gustman and 
Steinmeier (1986). An important theoretical prediction of this theory is that earlier and more 
generous availability of public old age benefits will increase the incidence of early exits from 
the labor force because early retirement becomes a more attractive choice for the individuals. 
Indeed, international comparisons such as those by Blöndal and Scarpetta (1998) or Duval 
(2003) find that early retirement is more prevalent in countries with more generous early 
retirement regulations. Furthermore, Gruber and Wise (1999) show for various countries that 
retirement tends to take place around the age when early retirement benefits can be claimed. 
The effects of labor demand on early retirement have received far less attention. Classical 
theory predicts that firms should pay their workers their marginal product and should have no 
incentive to induce early retirement. Although Lazear (1979) does not explicitly address the 
issue of early retirement, his analysis provides both a supply  and demand side explanation of 
the institution of mandatory retirement. In his moral hazard model, employers and employees 
agree to a contract that pays younger workers wages below their VMP (value of marginal 
product), and older workers more than their VMP. Due to moral hazard, such contracts assure 
that  workers'  lifetime  VMP  is  larger  than  in  the  absence  of  such  contracts.  However,  a 
necessary condition for such payment schemes is mandatory retirement, i.e., a date at  which a 
worker is no longer entitled to receive a wage greater than his VMP. Stern (1987, 1994) 
shows that, if a worker's position affects utility and/or productivity, then a firm can induce its   2 
workers to retire before their marginal product equals their reservation wage. In essence, older 
works  have  better  jobs  which  are  more  productive  and  provide  the  most  position  utility. 
Retirement of an older worker implies that a younger worker can be promoted, thus becoming 
more productive, enjoying greater position utility and, as a result, requiring lower wages in 
order to remain at the firm. In the same line of theory, Hutchens (1999) develops an implicit 
contract  model  in  which  early  retirement  also  arises  out  of  firms'  profit  maximization 
behavior.  Firms  actively  use  wage  and  pension  structures  to  influence  or  even  determine 
workers' retirement decisions. Particularly, as a response to adverse demand shocks, firms 
choose to direct workers toward early retirement. In fact, the option of continuing work might 
be  so  restricted  by  firms  that  workers  no  longer  perceive  their  early  retirement  as  an 
individual choice, but as a forced decision.1 In accordance with the supply side theory, the 
model by Hutchens (1999) also predicts that higher early retirement benefits increase the 
incidence of early retirement. However, this is not caused by the fact that more workers 
choose  to  retire  early,  but  by  the  fact  that  firms  increasingly  push  workers  into  early 
retirement. Social security benefits can act as a form of unemployment insurance, effectively 
subsidizing workforce reductions by lowering the cost to the firm of shedding older workers. 
In  other  words,  generous  social  security  provisions  for  early  retirement  might  have  the 
undesirable effect of reducing employment and creating involuntary early retirement instead. 
Although  sufficient  anecdotal  evidence  on  the  importance  of  the  phenomenon  of 
involuntary early retirement exists (e.g. Schmähl 2003 for the case of Germany), we are not 
aware of empirical studies that document the extent and determinants of involuntary early 
retirement.2 This is particularly true in a cross national setting   a setting that is essential when 
trying to assess the role national regulations (e.g. in the field of social security or employment 
protection legislation) on early retirement behavior. The main contribution of this paper is to 
provide international evidence on the extent to which early retirement is involuntary and on 
the factors that influence the ratio of voluntary to involuntary early retirement. This is done by 
analyzing a unique international microdata set covering 19 countries. Our results show that 
the extent to which early retirement is involuntary varies greatly among countries. While 
                                                 
1   Throughout this paper, we sometimes use the terms 'involuntary' or 'forced' early retirement when referring 
to a situation where a worker retires due to restrictions on continuing employment. While a firm can not 
literally force a worker to retire, workers are likely to perceive a retirement as forced when they no longer 
have access to employment at an acceptable wage. In fact, the empirical analysis of this paper shows that 
many early retirees assess their early retirement as being "not by choice".  
2   In a recent study that analyzes a related topic, Hakola and Uusitalo (in press) showed that the introduction of 
an experience rating for early retirement benefits in Finland decreased the unemployment risk of older 
workers. They interpret their results as evidence that firms encourage their workers to retire early in order to 
reduce or renew the workforce.   3 
rising unemployment rates and strict employment protection legislations increase the share of 
involuntary retirements among the early retirees, more generous social security systems do 
not lead to a higher portion of voluntary early retirements. 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides the theoretical background of the 
empirical analysis. It summarizes both a basic life cycle model of supply side retirement and 
Hutchens'  (1999)  model  of  demand side driven  retirement.  This  model  is  particularly 
illustrative for explaining the reasons for involuntary early retirement. Section 3 defines and 
describes  early  retirement  in  an  international  context.  Section  4  discusses  the  data  and 
methodology used in this study. Section 5 presents the results of the analysis on the voluntary 
and involuntary retirement and section 6 concludes.   
 
 
2.  The Classical Life-Cycle Model and Hutchens' Implicit Contract Model 
 
In a review of the early literature on the retirement decision, Mitchell and Fields (1982) 
summarize  the  basic  structure  of  supply side  models  of  retirement  that  use  a  life cycle 
framework. A worker has a utility U which is a positive function of the lifetime consumption 
vector C and the lifetime leisure vector L: U=U(C,L). Consumption increases with income Y, 
where income depends on earnings (E1, E2, …, ER) until retirement at time R and on pension 
benefits (PR+1, PR+2, …, PT) in the remaining years of life: Y=Y(E1, E2, …, ER, PR+1, PR+2, …, 
PT).  
The public and/or private pensions Pt are an increasing function of the retirement date R 
and an aspect of working W that increases pension benefits: Pt= Pt(R,W) for all periods t. W 
can be an aspect of work such as years of employment or contributions to a pension plan, and 
it is a nondecreasing function of lifetime labor H: W=W(H). The lifetime labor supply vector 
H and the lifetime leisure vector L sum up to a constant time endowment c. Consequently, 
total life cycle utility can be expressed as  
(1)    [ ] { } 1 1 ,..., , ( (L), ),..., ( (L), ) ,L R R T U U C E E P W R P W R + =  
The worker maximizes utility by choice of a labor supply path H, which specifies the 
retirement date R. H=c-L is an increasing function of the lifetime streams of earnings E, 
pensions P, and possible other explanatory variables X: H=H(E, P, X).  
Some testable predictions of this theory with regard to the choice of the retirement date, 
which we will consider in the empirical part of the paper, are 
1) An exogenous and uniform increase of public or private pensions lowers the retirement 
age due to equally directed substitution and wealth effects.   4 
2) If the present value of lifetime pension benefits falls when retirement is delayed, the 
worker has an incentive to retire earlier. In an extreme case, the pension benefit of every 
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3) An exogenous increase of the worker's earnings has ambiguous effects on the choice of 
retirement.  The  resulting  wealth  effect  suggests  an  earlier  retirement,  but  the  substitution 
effect favors a later retirement. However, if the worker starts with an exogenous level of 
wealth  A  and  his  consumption  C  depends  positively  on  A,  an  increase  in  wealth 
unambiguously leads to an earlier retirement. 
The  supply side  approach  to  retirement  has  proved  very  valuable  in  explaining  many 
empirical  observations  regarding  retirement.  Moreover,  the  life cycle  model  provides  the 
flexibility to accommodate further aspects of the retirement decision in more sophisticated 
versions of the model.3 However, the limitation of this class of models is that they tend to 
treat the behavior of the employer in a cursory way. 
A  different  approach  that  highlights  the  employer's  influence  on  worker's  retirement 
behavior is the model proposed by Hutchens (1999). He developed an implicit contract model 
of early retirement with two actors: a risk neutral firm and a risk averse worker. The worker's 
risk aversion and the desire for consumption smoothing assures that the firm will enter into a 
three period contract with the worker and thereby raising its profits.  
Under this contract, the worker is employed in the first period, either employed or early 
retired in the second period, and nonemployed in the third period. Employment status is hence 
only uncertain in the second period, where an early retirement can take place.  
The worker lives for two periods with certainty and has an exogenous probability s of 
surviving to the third period. His expected lifetime utility is the sum of expected utility in the 
three periods (with no discounting). If he is employed, he has utility U(wi), where wi is the 
wage in period i. In case of retirement, the utility is U(bi + gi + zi), where bi is a period i 
private pension payment, gi is a old age pension payment of the government's social security 
program and zi is the period i consumption value of home production. The period values of zi 
are z1 = 0, z3 = zm, and z2, which is only revealed at the beginning of the second period and 
has a known distribution f(z2) for 0 ≤ z2 ≤ zm.  
If the worker retires only in period three, he will receive a social security benefits g3 in that 
period. In case of an early retirement in period 2, the worker will get a social security benefit 
                                                 
3   Extended  models  can  for  instance  include  investment  decisions  (e.g.  Kingston  2000)  or  family 
considerations (e.g. Gustman and Steinmeier 2000).   5 
g2 in both the second and third period. Actuarial adjustments of social security benefits are 
represented by specifying this social security benefit as g2 = g3    . If there is no actuarial 
adjustment, then  =0 and if the system is actuarially fair, then g2 + sg2 = sg3 = s(g2 +  ), i.e., 
  = g2/s. As the third period social security benefits depend on second period employment 
status,  so  does  third period  private  pensions.  Let 
1
3 b   and 
0
3 b   be  the  third period  private 
pensions  for  individuals  that  were  employed  and  early  retired  in  the  second  period, 
respectively.  
The worker has two possible marginal products,  ( ) H θ and  ( ) L θ  with  ( ) H θ >  ( ) L θ  ≥ 0 
and  ( ) L θ <  zm.  The  first period  and  the  last period  marginal  product  is  ( ) H θ and  ( ) L θ , 
respectively; the lower marginal product in period three is due to aging. As for the second 
period value of home production, the marginal product in period 2 only becomes known to the 
firm and the worker at the beginning of that period. The realization of θ2 depends on the 
demand for the firm's products which determines the its second period technology and hence 
the extent to which the worker's skills will match the technology. The marginal product in 
period 2 will take a value of  ( ) L θ  in case of a demand shock, and a value of  ( ) H θ  if no such 
shock occurs. Both scenarios are assumed to have a probability of 0.5. 
Letting p2 denote the probability that the worker is employed in period 2, the expected 
utility of the worker is hence as follows:  
(2)   
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The  firm's  expected  profit  π ,  which  is  the  sum  of  its  expected  profits  over  the  three 
periods, can be denoted as: 
(3)     ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) { } ( )
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Workers and firms negotiate a three period contract over wages, private pensions, and 
employment probabilities. The firm chooses the variables w1, w(θ2, z2), p(θ2, z2), b(θ2, z2), 
and b3 to maximize its total profit subject to the constraint that the worker's total expected 
utility  must  not  be  smaller  than  the  (exogenous)  utility  that  he  could  obtain  from  a  job 
elsewhere  in  the  market.  The  result  of  the  firm's  profit  maximization  is  that  a  worker's 
employment status in the second period is determined by the following decision rule:  
(4)   
2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2
If    z , then p( , z )=1





≥ + − 
+ − 
 
An important point to notice in this model is that wages, private pensions and third period 
social security benefits do not enter into the early retirement decision. Here, early retirement 
only results of a firm's profit maximization. While the contract is specified such that the 
worker will initially voluntarily enter the contract, it is well possible that he will ex-post 
perceive a company mandated early retirement according to (4) as being involuntary. 
The solution (4) shows that early retirement is affected by the level of social security early 
retirement  benefits  and  in  particular  by  the  extent  of  actuarial  adjustment.  If  actuarial 
adjustment is not full, i.e.   < g2/s, then an increase in social security benefits for early 
retirees raises the probability of early retirement. The reason for this is that early retirement 
benefits allows the firm to reduce its second period private pensions, which in turn reduces 
the costs of early retirement and thereby increasing the incident of early retirement. If full 
actuarial adjustment takes place, then payment of social security benefits to early retirees does 
not affect early retirement. Note that in case of no full actuarial adjustment, the level of early 
retirement that results from the solution (4) is inefficiently high, since the firm will send 
employees into early retirement even if their labor product is larger than the marginal value of 
home consumption. In an extension of this model, it can also be easily shown that a payroll 
tax that is levied on earnings but not on pensions will further increase the prevalence of early 
retirement, because the firm's profit when employing the worker will decrease, while the 
profit in case of early retirement remains unaffected. 
This model gives rise to the following hypothesis which will be tested in the empirical part 
of the paper: 
1) A higher level of public early retirement benefits g2 leads to more early retirement by 
subsidizing the firms' workforce reductions. 
2) A low actuarial adjustment   of the pensions also contributes to more early retirement.  
3) Product demand shocks induce firms to send employees into early retirement because 
they decrease workers' labor product θ2.   7 
While Hutchens' (1999) model explicitly models the firm's behavior, it does not take into 
account  that  firms  may  also  have  the  possibility  to  lay  off  workers     a  practice  often 
encountered in reality. We therefore propose a further hypothesis: 
4)  In  countries  with  a  rigid  employment  protection  legislation,  firm driven  early 
retirements  are  more  widespread  since  layoffs  are  not  a  readily  available  alternative  for 
reducing staff.  
The  comparison  of  these  hypothesis  with  the  predictions  of  the  supply side  theory  as 
described above shows several similarities. In particular, generous early retirement provisions 
of  the  social  security  system  are  expected  to  increase  early  retirement  according  to  both 
theories.  A  strength  of  Hutchens'  (1999)  model  is  that  it  explicitly  models  how  product 
demand  shocks  and  the  resulting  desire  of  firms  to  reduce  staff  affect  the  employment 
opportunities of a worker. While supply side models could in theory accommodate variations 
in the wages offered to workers, the review article by Hurd (1990) points out that this aspect 
is often neglected, at least in empirical analysis: "Assuming that the worker could choose 
hours and years of work freely at the preretirement wage, which is the only one observed for 
that worker, leads to the incorrect conclusion that the worker retired because of a shift in the 
position or shape of his indifference curves, when, in fact, he retired because of unobserved 
employment  constraints."  (Hurd  1990,  p.  597).  Conversely,  one  aspect  of  the  retirement 
decision that is better reflected by the supply side models than in the Hutchens (1999) model 
is the fact that a worker can hardly be "forced" into early retirement in the sense that he is not 
allowed  to  search  for  another  job.  If  there  is  not  only  one,  but  several  firms,  and  if  the 
product demand shocks affect only some of these firms, the worker might still find a job at 
attractive conditions. At least in many European countries, however, there is evidence that 
older employees face considerable difficulties in finding employment. In a comprehensive 
review of empirical studies from various European countries, Taylor (2001) concludes that 
employers' attitudes and policies toward older employees imply a strong age discrimination in 
the  labor  market,  for  instance  by  setting  age  limits  in  recruiting.4  Consequently,  workers 
exceeding a certain age no longer have attractive employment options with other firms. In 
such cases, Hutchens' (1999) one firm model would be applicable.  
 
 
                                                 
4   Constraints to the employment of older workers can also stem from regulations of the social security system. 
For instance, firms in Switzerland have to pay contributions to mandatory private pension funds and the 
contribution rates increase with the worker's age (see Dorn and Sousa Poza 2003).   8 
3.  Data and Definitions 
 
Before discussing early retirement in more depth, it is useful to clearly define the concept 
of "retirement" which can have different meanings. According to OECD (1995), three broad 
definitions of retirement can be distinguished: (i) being a recipient of a public or private old 
age pension, regardless of the current employment status; (ii) being out of the labor force, 
regardless of the reason for ceasing work and no matter whether an old age pension is being 
drawn; or (iii) having a self described status of retired, regardless of employment status and 
receipt of a pension. These definitions of retirement can easily be transformed into definitions 
of early retirement if the retirement takes place prior to the individual reaching the legally 
defined standard retirement age.  
In this paper, early retirement is defined based on a combination of the second and third 
concept. In other words, retirement is a self declared state and only individuals who are out of 
the labor force are considered to be retirees.  
The international comparison of voluntary and involuntary early retirement is conducted 
using  data  from  the  1997  International  Social  Survey  Program  (ISSP).  The  ISSP  is  a 
continuing annual program of cross national collaboration which started in 1985. The data are 
collected  by  independent  institutions  in  the  participating  countries  using  the  same 
questionnaire. The topics of the annual surveys change from year to year. In 1997, 34,835 
individuals were interviewed on "Work Orientations", covering issues on work content and 
organization as well as general attitudes towards work and leisure. Our analysis includes the 
following 19 countries: Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, 
Italy,  Japan,  the  Netherlands,  New  Zealand,  Norway,  Poland,  Portugal,  Slovenia,  Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, and the USA.5  
As laid out above, the ISSP data allows us to identify individuals who (i) were no longer 
working and who (ii) assessed their own status as being early retired. Importantly, all early 
retired persons had to state either "I retired early - by choice" or "I retired early - not by 
choice". We use this information to define a dichotomous dependent variable having a value 
equal to one if the respondent retired early in an involuntary manner ("not by choice"), and 
equal to zero if early retirement was voluntary ("by choice"). This variable is analyzed with a 
series of probit models. The analysis covers the early retirement of individuals aged 45 to 64 
who retired between 1983 and 1997. This broad definition allows for a reasonable sample size 
                                                 
5   Six developing countries from Asia and Eastern Europe were excluded from the analysis because the data 
set contained very few early retirement observations for these countries.   9 
of 651 early retirees in the multivariate analysis. Table A1 in the appendix summarizes the 
corresponding explanatory variables.6  
In addition to the ISSP variables, our analysis includes variables referring to general 
economic  and  social  security  characteristics  of  the  different  countries.  These  macro level 
variables are included to test the theoretical predictions that were discussed in section 2 of this 
paper.  Wealth  level  as  a  supply side  determinant  of  early  retirement  is  represented  by  a 
country's real GDP per capita in the year of an individual's early retirement. The data is taken 
from Penn World Tables (Heston et al. 2002). Product demand shocks, which can trigger 
early retirement in the framework of Hutchens (1999), are characterized by the increase of the 
unemployment rate between the year before the retirement and the year of retirement. The 
data sources for this variable and for the OECD Employment Protection Legislation Index7  
for the year 1990 are OECD (1999) and (2004b), respectively. 
There are two main characteristics of old age pensions systems that supposedly affect 
early retirement. First, the expected old age pension replacement rate at a given age measures 
the  expected  pension  income  as  a  fraction  of  the  earnings  just  prior  to  retirement.  The 
replacement  rate  can  thus  be  interpreted  as  an  indicator  for  the  generosity  of  an  old age 
pension system.8 Second, the decrease in accumulated pension wealth accrual measures the 
reduction in expected lifetime pension income that results from postponing retirement. Such a 
decline in pension wealth accrual is equivalent to an implicit tax on continued work and is 
characteristic for a pension system that is actuarially unfair. In an actuarially neutral pension 
system,  pension  wealth  accrual  is  invariant  to  the  retirement  age.  Our  models  include 
variables for the average old age pension gross replacement rate between age 60 and 64 in the 
year  of  retirement  and  for  the  decrease  in  accumulated  pension  wealth  accrual  when 
postponing retirement from age 55 to 64. These variables take into account both public social 
security pensions and mandatory private pensions. The pension replacement rate data has 
                                                 
6   The  main  advantage  of  the  ISSP  data  is  that  it  allows  us  to  identify  voluntary  and  involuntary  early 
retirement in an international setting and on a micro data level. The limitation of the data is that it is only 
cross sectional. We can therefore not identify specific characteristics of individuals' pre retirement jobs such 
as occupation. Moreover, it is not possible to readily compare early retired individuals to people who did not 
retire early since the identification of persons belonging to the latter group is difficult given the lack of 
information on previous working status (see also Dorn and Sousa Poza 2005 for a further discussion of this 
issue). 
7   The index refers to the strictness of employment protection for regular employment and is based on a variety 
of criteria including notice period, amount of severance pay, and definition of unfair dismissal.  
8  In a life cycle framework with certain restrictive conditions, the level of public pensions should have no 
effect on the choice of a retirement date. This is the case if contributions to the pension system are perceived 
as savings, if pension benefits paid equal the amount of contributions paid, and if the interest rate equals the 
rate of growth of total wages.   10 
been provided by Romain Duval (part of this data is published in Duval, 2003, p. 39), while 
the pension wealth accrual data is taken from Blöndal and Scarpetta (1998, p. 65).9  
 
 
4.   Incidence of Involuntary Early Retirement 
 
The incidence of involuntary early retirement varies considerably among countries, as 
shown  in  table  1.  In  the  USA  and  in  Denmark,  only  one  out  of  ten  early  retirees  has 
involuntarily  moved  into  retirement.  Other  countries  with  very  low  rates  of  forced  early 
retirement are Canada, Japan, and Norway. Conversely, involuntary early retirement seems to 
be the rule rather than the exception in some continental European countries. In Germany, 
Portugal, and Hungary, more than half of all early retirements are not by choice.  
Clearly, these large differences in the incidence of involuntary early retirement call for an 
explanation. Based on the theory of Hutchens (1999), we would expect that a large extent of 
company driven  early  retirements  may  be  the  cause  for  involuntary  retirements.  This 
hypothesis will be tested in section 5.  
Research on the self declared motives for early retirement also suggests that, apart from 
the desire to leave work and company restructurings, poor health is among the most important 
causes for early retirement (see, e.g., Burtless and Quinn (2000) for the United States and 
Dorn and Sousa Poza (2004) for Switzerland). At least some of the retirees who leave the 
labor force due to poor health might assess their retirement as involuntary. While our data 
does  not  allow  us  to  control  for  individual  health,  it  does  not  seem  plausible  that  major 
differences in health levels among the countries in our sample should exist. Therefore, public 
health can hardly explain the large inter country variance in the proportion of involuntary 
early retirements.  
   
 
                                                 
9   Duval (2003) computed the pension replacement rates are a synthetic indicator based on six individual cases 
with different wage levels and different marital status. Pension wealth accruals reported by Blöndal and 
Scarpetta  (1998)  are  computed  based  on  singles  with  average  wages.  The  macro level  variables  are 
summarized in table A1 in the appendix. Note that some of the OECD variables are not available for four 
countries  in  our  sample  (Cyprus,  Hungary,  Poland,  Slovenia).  The  multivariate  analysis  will  hence  be 
restricted to the remaining 15 countries. 
   11 
Table 1: Involuntary Early Retirements as a Percentage of all Early Retirements  
and Early Retirees per Worker 
 
Country  Percentage of Involuntary Early 
Retirement 
Early Retirees per Worker, age 
group 45 69 
Hungary  62.1%  0.342 
Portugal  54.2%  0.165 
Germany  50.0%  0.183 
Slovenia  46.3%  0.344 
France  41.0%  0.081 
Poland  40.4%  0.269 
Sweden  37.5%  0.093 
Spain  32.5%  0.328 
Great Britain  28.9%  0.247 
Italy  28.6%  0.174 
New Zealand  26.2%  0.109 
Switzerland  20.5%  0.118 
Cyprus  17.1%  0.175 
Netherlands  16.7%  0.300 
Japan  15.9%  0.033 
Norway  13.0%  0.062 
Canada  12.2%  0.196 
United States  9.4%  0.080 
Denmark  8.8%  0.132 
Source: Based on ISSP 1997 data. Countries are sorted by the first data column. 
 
The exception to this rule might be the Eastern European countries. According to Szalai 
(1991),  retirement  in  Hungary     the  country  with  the  highest  ratio  of  involuntary  early 
retirement  in  our  sample     has  predominantly  been  caused  by  poor  health,  which  is 
widespread  among  workers.  Szalai  (1991)  argues  that  this  is  because  the  previous  state 
economy  had  many  jobs  with  physically  demanding  and  sometimes  hazardous  working 
conditions. Indeed, the high ratios of involuntary early retirement across all Eastern European 
countries in the sample suggest that the economic structures between 1983 and 1997, which 
covered both a period of state economy and the transition to a market economy, have led to a 
pattern  of  early  retirement  different  to  those  in  Western  European  or  North  American 
countries. A relatively low standard of living even for well educated individuals implied that 
few people had the financial resources that facilitate a voluntary early retirement. Moreover, it 
is  plausible  that  the  economic  transition  that  took  place  in  Eastern  Europe  in  the  1990s 
produced  a  large  number  of  company driven  forced  early  retirements  in  the  course  of 
privatizations  and  reorganizations  of  state owned  companies.  The  high  incidence  of 
involuntary early retirement in Eastern Europe can hence possibly be explained by economic 
circumstances that led to a high number of retirements for health and company reasons, while 
the probability of voluntary early retirements was low.    12 
However, even when focusing on a more homogeneous sample of countries with well 
established industrialized market economies, as we will do in the econometric analysis in 
section 5, large differences in the incidence of involuntary early retirement remain.10  
In  addition  to  the  incidence  of  involuntary  early  retirement,  table  1  also  contains  a 
measure for the general prevalence of early retirement (both voluntary and involuntary) in the 
respective countries. This measure is the ratio of early retirees per active worker in the age 
group 45 to 69. Again, large international differences can be observed. In Hungary, Slovenia, 
and Spain, this early retirement ratio exceeds 0.3, while there are less than 0.1 early retired 
persons per active worker in the United States, Japan, or Norway. 
 
Table 2: Correlations between Ratio of Involuntary Early Retirement, Early 
Retirees per Worker, and Labor Force Participation Rate 
 
  Ratio of Involuntary 
Early Retirement 




(age 55 64) 
Pearson Correlation       





(p =0.047, n=19) 
 0.518** 
(p=0.033, n=17) 
Early Retirees per 
Worker 






(age 55 64) 
    1.000 
(n=17) 
Kendall's Tau-b Correlation     





(p =0.068, n=19) 
 0.529*** 
(p=0.003, n=17) 
Early Retirees per 
Worker 






(age 55 64) 
    1.000 
(n=17) 
Sources: Ratio of Involuntary Early Retirement and Early Retirees per Worker based on ISSP 1997 data, Labor 
Force Participation Rates based on OECD (2004a). */**/*** denote significance at the 10%/5%/1% level. Note 
that the OECD data does not contain participation rates for Cyprus and Slovenia. 
 
Table 2 reports the correlations between involuntary early retirement, early retirement 
ratios, and labor force participation rates. It is not surprising that there is a highly significant 
negative correlation between the early retirement ratio and the labor force participation rates 
of older persons (age 55 to 64), because a high incidence of early retirement has often been 
                                                 
10  Countries excluded from the analysis are Cyprus, Hungary, Slovenia, and Poland, for which some of the 
aggregate OECD data is not available. 
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identified as a cause for low participation rates. A striking result, however, is the significant 
and  relatively  sizable  positive  correlation  between  the  percentage  of  involuntary  early 
retirement among early retirees and the number of early retirees per worker. Countries with a 
large proportion of involuntary early retirement also tend to have lower participation rates. 
These results accentuate the empirical importance of involuntary early retirement, and they 
establish a link between the relative proportion of involuntary early retirement among early 
retirees, which will be analyzed in section 5, and the overall incidence of early retirement and 
labor force participation. 
 
 
5. Determinants of Involuntary Early Retirement 
 
We estimate a series of probit models that analyze the determinants of the probability that 
an  early  retirement  was  involuntary.  The  sample  contains  observations  referring  to  early 
retired persons from 15 OECD member countries.11 It includes individuals who went into 
early retirement between 1983 and 1997 and at ages between 45 and 64. Weights are adjusted 
to give every country the same weight in the total sample. Furthermore, the Moulton (1990) 
problem that is associated with estimating the effects of macro level variables on micro units 
is taken into account by clustering standard errors by countries using the standard technique 
described by Froot (1989). 
The main focus of the analysis is on the impact of various social security and labor 
market variables on involuntary early retirement. Notably, we are interested to see whether 
the results provide support for the presence of demand side early retirement as proposed by 
Hutchens  (1999).  In  the  framework  of  this  theory,  we  would  expect  that  favorable  early 
retirement provisions of social security systems (represented by high pension replacement 
rates and decreasing pension wealth accruals) and adverse economic conditions (represented 
by increasing unemployment rates) lead to company driven early retirements, which tend to 
be involuntary from a worker's perspective. Furthermore, we hypothesize that a more strict 
employment protection legislation might encourage companies to use forced early retirement 
as a means of reducing staff. 
Conversely,  a  pure  supply side  explanation  of  early  retirement  that  abstracts  from 
demand side effects would, all else being equal, predict that a higher level of wealth and 
                                                 
11   Canada,  Denmark,  France,  Germany,  Great  Britain,  Italy,  Japan,  Netherlands,  New  Zealand,  Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the USA.    14 
favorable early retirement provisions increase the number of persons who voluntarily choose 
early retirement. 
Table 3 shows probit estimations of the determinants of involuntary early retirement. 
Apart from social security and labor market characteristics, the estimated models (I) to (IV) 
also control for the socio demographic factors gender, marital status, and age at retirement, as 
well as for the year of retirement.  
Model (I) in table 3 considers the impact of the socio demographic variables and national 
wealth on the probability that an early retirement was involuntary. Gender and marital status 
do not have significant effects when we allow for a gender specific impact of marriage by 
including an interaction term between gender and marriage.12 We also estimated the models 
(II)  to  (IV)  for  both  genders  separately,  but  found  no  gender specific  impact  of  the 
institutional variables.13  
It is not surprising that early retirements at age 45 to 59 are more often involuntary than 
retirements at age 60 to 64. A voluntary early retirement only becomes an attractive option 
once an individual has had enough time to accumulate a sufficient level of private and public 
pension wealth to fund consumption in old age. The variables for retirement years do not 
show a clear trend in the proportion of involuntary early retirement, although the share of 
forced early retirement in 1995 to 1997 is significantly larger than in the reference period 
1983 to 1985. 
 
                                                 
12   Several empirical studies such as Pozzenbon and Mitchell (1989) or Peracchi and Welch (1994) have found 
that married women tend to retire earlier than married men, possibly because "married women appear to 
value nonwork years highly" (Pozzenbon and Mitchell 1989, p. 20). 
13   The gender specific results are not shown here because they yield little additional insights. These results are 
available from the authors upon request. 
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Table 3: Probit estimations of the determinants of involuntary early retirement in 15 countries 
  Dependent Variable: Involuntary Early Retirement (=1 if early retirement was involuntary, =0 if early retirement was by choice) 
  Model (I)  Model (II)  Model (III)  Model (IV) 
         
Intercept  0.716  (0.501)  0.776*  (0.516)  0.143  (0.655)  0.211  (0.695) 
                 
Female   0.171  (0.305)   0.180  (0.306)   0.160  (0.298)   0.164  (0.305) 
Married   0.130  (0.190)   0.146  (0.191)   0.167  (0.185)   0.162  (0.189) 
Female x Married   0.183  (0.340)    0.183  (0.340)   0.177  (0.335)   0.186  (0.339) 
Retirement age 55 59  0.475***  (0.124)  0.474***  (0.136)  0.473***  (0.116)  0.488***  (0.129) 
Retirement age 50 54  0.613***  (0.183)  0.600***  (0.190)  0.676***  (0.195)  0.675***  (0.206) 
Retirement age 45 49  0.612**  (0.267)  0.571**  (0.270)  0.691**  (0.273)  0.688**  (0.287) 
Early retired in 1995 1997  0.527*  (0.280)  0.559**  (0.280)  0.539*  (0.302)  0.551*  (0.321) 
Early retired in 1992 1994  0.145  (0.256)  0.151  (0.247)  0.036  (0.246)  0.032  (0.256) 
Early retired in 1989 1991  0.280  (0.268)  0.312  (0.263)  0.281  (0.269)  0.285  (0.275) 
Early retired in 1986 1988   0.051  (0.339)   0.029  (0.343)   0.017  (0.320)   0.003  (0.361)  
Real GDP p.c. (year of 
retirement)   0.090***  (0.015)   0.094***  (0.015)   0.072***  (0.019)   0.074***  (0.022) 
                 
Average pension gross 
replacement rate (age 60 64)       0.158  (0.226)       0.251  (0.197) 
Decrease of pension wealth 
accrual (age 55 to age 64)      0.047**  (0.023)      0.024  (0.025) 
                 
Change of unemployment 
rate (year of retirement)          0.115**  (0.048)  0.121***  (0.046) 
OECD employment 
protection legislation index          0.099**  (0.043)  0.102*  (0.059) 
         
Number of observations  651  651  651  651 
Log pseudo likelihood   331.208   330.358   327.494   326.986 
         
Wald tests for joint insignificance        
Pension gross replacement rate = pension wealth accrual = 0  6.47**    2.04 
Average unemployment rate = Employment protect. legislation = 0    10.65***  10.14*** 
Notes: The reference person is male, unmarried, and has retired between age 60 and 64 and between the years 1983 to 1985. Standard errors are clustered by country and shown in parenthesis. 
Observations are weighted with "federal" weights that give each country the same weight in the total sample. The Wald statistics have Chi square distributions with 2 degrees of freedom. */**/*** 
denotes significance at the 10/5/1 percent level.  16 
An  increasing  level  of  wealth  is,  according  to  Burtless  and  Quinn  (2000),  the  most 
powerful  explanation  for  the  trend  to  earlier  retirement  that  most  industrialized  countries 
experienced during the past 50 years. The reason for this is that voluntary early retirement has 
become more affordable. In the international sample, we find that higher national wealth 
levels are indeed associated with a larger share of voluntary early retirement.  
Model  (II)  adds  the  two  variables  referring  to  the  generosity  of  the  early  retirement 
provisions  of  the  public  (or  mandatory  private)  old age  pensions.  In  accordance  with  the 
supply side theory of retirement, a higher pension gross replacement rate tends to increase the 
share of voluntary early retirement (this effect is, however, not significant at conventional 
levels). Conversely, a high decrease in pension wealth accrual between age 55 and age 64, 
which  indicates an  actuarially  unfair  pension  system,  is  associated  with  a  larger  share of 
involuntary retirement. This result is at odds with a pure supply side perspective of early 
retirement  that  explains  the  positive  impact  of  generous  social  security  systems  on  early 
retirement solely with larger incentives for a voluntary retirement. Instead, this finding lends 
support  to  the  theory  of  Hutchens  (1999)  which  states  that  favorable  early  retirement 
provisions  (such  as  little  actuarial  adjustment  to  early  retirement  benefits)  increase  the 
inclination of firms to encourage workers to retire early.  
In model (III), the impact of labor market conditions on involuntary early retirement is 
considered.  The  proportion  of  involuntary  retirement  is  significantly  higher  in  years  with 
increasing unemployment rates. For the case of Switzerland, Dorn and Sousa Poza (2004) 
have previously shown that there is parallel movement of the unemployment rate and the 
portion  of  early  retirement  that  is  due  to  company  reorganizations.  Such  findings  are 
consistent  with  the  theory  of  Hutchens  (1999)  according  to  which  firms  promote  early 
retirement when they are confronted with adverse demand shocks, such as in an economic 
recession.  
One  aspect  that  is  not  fully  covered  by  this  theory,  however,  is  the  question  why 
companies should prefer the option of forced early retirement to layoffs, although a firm 
financed early retirement program (that possibly includes extraordinary pension payments to 
retirees)  can  be  costly.  Certainly,  forced  early  retirements  are  often  better  accepted  than 
layoffs  by  a  company’s  employees,  labor  unions,  and  the  public.  But  apart  from  these 
considerations, in some countries, early retirement may, due to strict employment protection 
legislation, be the only feasible option for reducing (senior) staff. This hypothesis is indeed 
supported  by  the  results  of  model  (III)  which  show  a  positive  impact  of  the  OECD 
employment protection legislation index on the share of involuntary early retirement.   17 
A specific example of an early retirement practice that reacts to employment protection 
legislation  is  Germany's  "59  provision"  (see,  e.g.,  Schmähl,  2003):  because  of  legal 
difficulties  to  layoff  older  workers,  employers  offer  severance  packages  to  workers  who 
"agree" to give up their jobs. The jobless older individuals then first receive unemployment 
benefits for at least a year before moving into early retirement at age 60, when unemployed 
people become entitled to public old age pensions. This example documents how a relatively 
rigid  employment  protection  legislation  (and  generous  early  retirement  provisions  of  the 
social security system) can lead to an increased use of forced early retirement by companies in 
order to circumvent this law. 
In  model  (IV),  where  both  social  security  and  labor  market  variables  are  included, 
employment protection legislation and the change of the unemployment remain significant 
positive determinants of forced early retirement with almost unchanged coefficient values. 
These results support the notion of demand side effects on early retirement as predicted by 
Hutchens  (1999).  The  impacts  of  the  social  security  variables  on  the  proportions  of 
involuntary  and  voluntary  early  retirement  are  insignificant  and  the  hypothesis  that  the 
pension replacement rate and pension wealth accrual variables have coefficients equal to zero 
cannot  be  rejected  (as  indicated  by  a  Wald  test).  Using  the  same  variables  and  a  nearly 
identical sample of countries, the OECD studies by Blöndal and Scarpetta (1998) and Duval 
(2003)  have  found  that  generous  provisions  of  the  social  security  system  increase  the 
incidence of early retirement. The results presented here, however, suggest that this increase 
is not only due to more voluntary, but also due to more involuntary early retirement. 
 
 
6.   Summary and Conclusions 
 
In  microeconomic  theory,  early  retirement  is  usually  interpreted  as  a  supply side 
phenomenon. Increasing wealth and favorable early retirement provisions of public old age 
insurances have been identified as causes for early retirement. The fact that a large share of 
early retirees perceive their retirement as being "not by choice", or involuntary, is difficult to 
reconcile with purely supply side explanations. Surprisingly, very few retirement models that 
explicitly integrate a demand side perspective can be found in the literature. A noteworthy 
exception is the theory of Hutchens (1999) which presents a model of a firm that uses social 
security early retirement benefits as a form of unemployment insurance. The model predicts   18 
that, in order to reduce staff during economic recessions, companies force individuals into 
early retirement. 
This  paper  provides  an  empirical  analysis  of  the  impact  of  social  security  and  labor 
market characteristics on involuntary early retirement in 15 countries. The results support the 
notion that involuntary early retirement is an empirically important phenomenon. In some 
countries, including Germany and Portugal, the portion of early retirees who have not retired 
by choice is at fifty percent or even higher. Moreover, this percentage tends to be particularly 
high in countries with low labor market participation rates of older persons. 
The  empirical  analysis  shows  that  increasing  unemployment  rates  and  high  levels  of 
employment protection legislation encourage involuntary early retirement. This suggests that 
companies use forced early retirements to reduce staff during economic slowdowns and they 
make  increased  use  of  this  measure  if  it  allows  them  to  circumvent  rigid  employment 
protection legislation.  
While  there  is  considerable  previous  evidence  that  more  generous  early  retirement 
features of social security systems increase the incidence of early retirement, their effect on 
the proportion of involuntary early retirement is by no means trivial: high replacement rates 
seem  to  be  associated  with  more  voluntary,  and  actuarially  unfair  pension  systems  with 
involuntary early retirement. These results are consistent with the interpretation that more 
generous early retirement features of social security systems can lead to an increase in both 
voluntary and involuntary early retirements, as individuals face stronger incentives to choose 
an  earlier  retirement  date,  while  firms  take  advantage  of  the  favorable  public  retirement 
provisions by forcing more employees into early retirement.  
In  conclusion,  the  empirical  analysis  suggests  that,  apart  form  voluntary  retirement 
(which can conveniently be explained by the classic labor supply models of retirement), some 
countries are also confronted with a high incidence of involuntary early retirement. In our 
opinion,  demand side  models  such  as  the  one  by  Hutchens  (1999)  are  better  suited  for 
explaining such observations. Clearly, early retirement research in these countries should take 
into account that early retirement is not always the result of a free choice between attractive 
options, but sometimes the consequence of a forced decision that is strongly influenced by 
employers' behavior. 
Moreover,  the  results  can  shed  a  new  light  on  the  welfare  effects  of  generous  early 
retirement  provisions  of  social  security  systems  and  more  rigid  employment  protection 
legislations:  while  these  regulations  are  intended  to  be  beneficial  for  workers,  they  also 
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Table A1: Definitions and descriptive statistics of variables 
 
Variable name or 
variable group 
Definition and source (if other than ISSP 
1997) 
Mean  S.D.  Min.  Max. 
Involuntary early 
retirement 
1 if early retirement was 'not by choice' / 0 
if early retirement was 'by choice' 
0.26  0.44  0  1 
Female  1 if female    0.39  0.49  0  1 
Married  1 if married  0.73  0.44  0  1 
Female x Married  1 if female and married  0.22  0.42  0  1 
Retirement age  
1 if retired at age 60 64 
1 if retired at age 55 59  
1 if retired at age 50 54 









0  1 
Retirement year 
1 if retired in 1995 1997 
1 if retired in 1992 1994 
1 if retired in 1989 1991 
1 if retired in 1986 1988 











0  1 
Real GDP p.c. (year 
of retirement) 
National real GDP per capita in K USD in 
year of retirement. Source: Penn World 
Tables (Heston et al. 2002). 
19.66  3.88  9.00  30.19 
Average pension 
gross replacement 
rate (age 60 to age 
64) 
Average gross pension income from public 
and mandatory private occupational 
schemes between age 60 and age 64 for a 
person who retired at age 60 measured for 
the individual year of retirement, as a 
multiple of pre retirement annual income. 
Computed as an average of six cases with 
three different income levels and two 
marital statuses. Source: OECD (data 
summarized in Duval 2003, p. 39, 
comprehensive data provided by Duval). 
0.32  0.31  0.00  0.80 
Decrease of pension 
wealth accrual (age 
55 to age 64) 
Decrease in total pension wealth by 
continuing work from age 55 to age 65, as a 
multiple of the income at age 55. Computed 
based on singles with average wages. 
Source: OECD (Blöndal and Scarpetta 
1999, p. 65). 
1.12  1.40   0.40  7.90 
Change of 
unemployment rate 
(year of retirement) 
Change of the national unemployment rate 
between the year before retirement and the 
year of retirement in percentage points. 
Source: OECD (1999). 




OECD index for rigidity of employment 
protection legislation in 1990. Higher 
values represent a stricter legislation. 
Source: OECD (2004b). 
2.40  1.23  0.20  4.10 
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